The Saigon Regime in the United States’ Foreign Policy (1969 - 1975)

Abstract

Since 1954, the Saigon Government had become an essential component in the United States’ foreign policy. Washington’s objective was to transform South Vietnam into an American dependency while simultaneously containing and undermining the revolutionary movements in the three Indochinese countries. To achieve this aim, the U.S implemented various political and military strategies, including direct military intervention in South Vietnam. However, these strategies ultimately ended in failure. During the period from 1969 to 1975, the U.S was compelled to adjust its foreign policy pursuing the strategy of “Vietnamization of the war” while seeking a honorable withdrawal. The role of the Saigon Government also shifted, from that of an ally to a “political pawn” serving the international interests and prestige of the Nixon-Ford administrations. This article seeks to clarify the inherent limitations of U.S policy, thereby explaining the inevitable collapse of the Saigon regime.